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AN HMO DOES NOT OWE AN ERISA 

FIDUCIARY DUTY TO ITS EMPLOYEE 

BENEFICIARIES: AFTER PEGRAM V. 

HERDRICH, WHO WILL SPEAK FOR 

THE WORKING CLASS? 

L. DARNELL WEEDEN* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the past few decades an American health care system once 
defined by fee-for-service care has succumbed to domination by 
large, for-profit managed care organizations.! The corollary of this 
national shift in health care has been a major transfer of financial 
and administrative power from doctors and hospitals to insurers 
and Health Management Organizations ("HMOs").2 Critics of the 
current system believe this shift in power has given managed care 
* Professor, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University; B.A., 
J.D., University of Mississippi. 
l. David H. Johnson, ERISA Fiduciary Duty Claims and Managed Care Liability: 
Implications of Herdrich v. Pegram, 11 HEALTH L., May 1999, at 1, l. "The current 
market power of managed care signals a major shift of both financial and administrative 
power away from physicians and hospitals to manage care organizations." Id. Johnson 
believes doctors still exercise considerable authority to control medical care, but that 
doctors' medical care authority is significantly compromised. Id. A key provision of 
managed care is the transfer of financial risk for the provision of medical services for an 
assigned group of patients to physicians, medical groups, and other provider organiza­
tions. Id. "This assumption of financial risk for patient care by [doctors] charged with 
responsibility for delivering that care is at the heart of the public debate around man­
aged care." Id. 
2. See Raphael O. Boyd, HMO Liability: An Analysis of Patients' Legal Rights, 
NAT'L BAR ASS'N MAG., Oct.lNov. 2000, at 27, 28. 
HMO's began requiring physician's [sic] to obtain approval for treatments 
prior to providing the care. This is called the prospective utilization review. 
The process normally requires treatment and hospitalization requests by phy­
sicians to be approved by an HMO review board prior to the patient receiving 
the treatment. HMO review boards then made recommendations as to what 
treatment the HMO would or would not reimburse. If the HMO chooses not 
to reimburse for treatment, the patient may still decide to proceed with the 
treatment. However, the patient would have to pay for the care. Utilizing the 
prospective utilization process, HMOs have been able to save billions of dol­
lars in health care expenditures and have become very profitable. 
Id. at 28. 
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organizations control over the direction and disposition of medical 
treatment because of their perceived undue influence on the pock­
etbooks of health care professionals.3 Lawyers and policyrriakers 
on both sides of the managed care/health care debate are also'sensi­
tive to the growing resentment in the media and the public for the 
perceived substitution of economics for the Hippocratic Oath that 
once served as the cornerstone of medical care.4 The debate re­
flects a popular fear that, under the managed care system, doctors 
may be forced to choose between enhancing patient welfare and 
enhancing their own financial wellbeing through economic incen­
tives associated with reduced patient care.5 This creates a signifi­
cant problem of accountability from the public's perspective. If 
doctors choose the latter option and patient care suffers as a result, 
what methods of redress are available? 
Most Americans today participate in health care plans pro­
vided by their employers. For these individuals, there will be few, if 
any, avenues of relief for substandard treatment they may receive 
as a result of the current health care regime. This is because, as an 
employment-related benefit, their health plans are governed by the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").6 
ERISA is a statutory plan that regulates all "private employee ben­
efits plans, including both pension plans and welfare plans."7 A 
"welfare plan" includes "any plan, fund, or program" maintained 
for the purpose of providing medical or other health benefits for 
employees or their beneficiaries "through the purchase of insurance 
or otherwise."8 Because ERISA may preempt state law claims of 
medical malpractice, negligence, and other medical torts, individu­
als receiving health care coverage through their employers may be 
forced to resolve their health care grievances under the procedures 
set forth in the statute for a breach of fiduciary duty. 
3. William T. Robinson, III, New Deep Pocket: Managed Care Entity Liability for 
Alleged Improper Denial of Access, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 357 (1997). 
Managed health care has grown exponentially in recent years. The for-profit 
tempo of changes in the managed care field and the inter-relationship of orga­
nizations and professionals providing medical care services in and through or­
ganizations have an overriding or dominant rhythm that seems, like the 
rhythm of the business world, to permeate all decisions. 
[d. at 357. 
4. Id. 
5. Johnson, supra note 1, at 1. 
6. 29 U.S.c. § 1001 (1994). 
7. Dist. of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 127 (1992). 
8. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 222-23 (2000) (quoting 29 U.S.c. 
§ 1002(1)(A) (1994». 
383 2002] HMOs AND ERISA AFTER PEGRAM V. HERDRICH 
An employee may state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty 
under ERISA by alleging the following facts in the complaint: (1) 
that the defendants are plan fiduciaries; (2) that the defendants 
breached their fiduciary duties; and (3) that a cognizable loss re­
sulted.9 In Pegram v. Herdrich, the Supreme Court recently ex­
pounded upon the requirements one must meet in order to prove 
that an HMO breached its fiduciary duty.lO The Supreme Court 
ruled that the initial inquiry in cases alleging such a breach is 
whether adverse, mixed eligibility, and treatment decisionsll made 
by an HMO's physicians are fiduciary acts under ERISA.n In 
cases alleging breach of an ERISA fiduciary duty, a closely related 
question is whether the decision-maker was under a fiduciary duty 
while forming an adverse decision.13 
Whether an HMO is a fiduciary under ERISA when it acts 
through its physicians depends on some background of fact and law 
about HMOs and medical benefit plans.14 In the United States, 
physicians have traditionally provided care on a "fee-for-service" 
basis.Is A physician would charge a fee for a general exam or a 
medical procedure and then bill the patient for the services pro­
vided. If the patient had insurance, the doctor would submit the bill 
for the patient's care directly to the insurer.16 Under such fee-for­
service systems, as long as doctors continued to receive payments, a 
financial incentive existed for doctors to provide as much care as 
possibleY The only check on this "more care incentive" was a phy­
sician's duty to exercise reasonable medical skill and judgment in 
the patient's interest.Is 
In the late 1960s, insurers and others developed the HMO as a 
new model for health care delivery.19 
The defining feature of an HMO is receipt of a fixed fee for each 
patient enrolled under the terms of a contract to provide speci­
9. See 29 U.S.C. § ll04(a) (1994) (outlining the standard of care with respect to 
fiduciary duties). 
10. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 222-23. 
11. See infra note 33 and accompanying text for a discussion of eligibility 
decisions. 
12. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 222-26. 
13. Id. at 226. 
14. Id. at 218. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. (citations omitted). 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
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fied health care if needed. The HMO thus assumes the financial 
risk of providing the benefits promised: if a participant never gets 
sick, the HMO keeps the money regardless, and if a participant 
becomes expensively ill, the HMO is responsible for the treat­
ment agreed upon even if its cost exceeds the participant's 
premiums.2o 
HMOs, unlike doctors in the fee-for-service system, take steps to 
control costs because they are not passed on to the patient. To this 
extent, HMOs make coverage determinations by scrutinizing re­
quested services against the contractual provisions with the em­
ployer plan sponsor. This is to ensure "that a request for care falls 
within the scope of covered circumstances [e.g., pregnancy] or that 
a given treatment falls within the scope of the care promised [e.g., 
surgery]."21 HMOs also issue general guidelines informed by finan­
cial considerations to their physicians about appropriate levels of 
care.22 Unlike the fee-for-service system, a physician's financial in­
terest under an HMO plan "lies in providing less care, not more."23 
The balancing mechanism against an HMO's influence is the physi­
cian's professional obligation to provide covered services with a 
reasonable degree of skill.24 
HMOs originally gained popularity as the perception grew that 
fee-for-service physicians were providing unnecessary or useless 
services at great expense.25 Now many doctors argue that HMOs 
often sacrifice the patient's individual needs to improve the finan­
cial status of the HMO.26 One method commonly used by HMOs 
to reduce expenses is to provide "specific financial incentives" to 
doctors for reducing the use of health care treatment.27 
In Pegram, the Supreme Court discussed the nature of pure 
20. Id. at 218-19. 
21. Id. at 219. 
22. Id.; see also RAND E. ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN 
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 543-69 (1997) (discussing the modern managed care system in 
the United States). 
23. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 219. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 220. 
26. Id. (citing Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 375-78 (7th Cir. 1998) for various 
criticisms of HMO practices); see also John P. Little, D.M.D., Note, Managed Care 
Contracts of Adhesion: Terminating the Doctor-Patient Relationship and Endangering 
Patient Health, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1397, 1399-1400 (1997) (arguing that, because of 
their overly broad concern with increasing their profit margins, HMOs are to blame for 
inadequate medical treatment and the erosion of the doctor-patient relationship). 
27. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 219 (listing such incentives as rewarding physicians for 
using fewer HMO services and penalizing them for over-using treatments). 
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eligibility decisions, pure treatment decisions, and "mixed eligibility 
and treatment" decisions.28 Pure eligibility decisions are based on a 
plan's coverage of a specific medical procedure or treatment for a 
medical condition.29 By comparison, pure treatment decisions are 
choices about the diagnosis and substantive treatment of a patient's 
condition.3D Using the pure treatment decision, the physician eval­
uates a patient's symptoms and makes an educated guess about 
both the origin of the symptoms and the proper course of treat­
ment.31 In practice, "eligibility decisions cannot be untangled from 
physicians' judgments about reasonable medical treatment ...."32 
When eligibility decisions are embroiled with treatment decisions, 
they are referred to a.s mixed eligibility and treatment decisions.33 
The Pegram Court, recognizing that Congress imposed a flexi­
ble duty of loyalty on individuals administering ERISA plans, held 
that HMO owner-doctors34 do not act as fiduciaries when treating 
patients and making determinations about what types of injuries or 
illnesses are covered by their respective plans.35 The same fiduciary 
principles articulated in Pegram apply to all doctors working for 
HMOs, regardless of whether or not they own the HMO.36 As a 
result of Pegram, HMO owner-doctors can join other doctors who 
do not own HMOs in ignoring the single duty of loyalty to the ben­
eficiary, which is imposed on a common law trustee.37 Because of a 
lack of the single-duty, fiduciary loyalty imposed on a common law 
trustee, a doctor's financial self-interests may influence his decision­
28. /d. at 228-29. 
29. Id. at 228. 
30. Id. 
31. See id. 
32. Id. at 229. 
33. Id. 

The kinds of decisions mentioned in Herdrich's ERISA count ... are ... 

mixed eligibility and treatment decisions: physicians' conclusions about when 

to use diagnostic tests; about seeking consultations and making referrals to 

physicians and [other] facilities; about proper standards of care, the experi­

mental character of a proposed course of treatment, the reasonableness of a 

certain treatment, and the emergency character of a medical condition. 
Id. at 229-30. 
34. See id. at 211. Owner-doctors are physicians who have formed their own 
HMOs. These HMOs "function as a health maintenance organization (HMO) organ­
ized for profit. Its owners are physicians providing prepaid medical services to partici­
pants whose employers contract with [it] to provide such coverage." Id. at 215. 
35. Id. at 237. 
36. [d. at 220-22. 
37. [d. at 222 ("We think, then, that courts are not in a position to derive a sound 
legal principle to differentiate [a physician-owned] HMO ... from other HMOs."). 
386 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:381 
making; HMOs are thus insulated from lawsuits at the expense of 
patients' rights.38 
According to the Pegram Court, all HMOs are relieved of the 
ordinary duties owed by common law trustees because Congress 
never intended for an HMO to be characterized as a fiduciary to 
the extent that its physicians make mixed eligibility decisions.39 
Congress did not consider a mixed eligibility decision-maker as a 
fiduciary, according to the Supreme Court.40 The common law 
trustee's primary concern has traditionally "been the payment of 
money in the interest of the beneficiary."41 The Supreme Court 
reasoned that because a doctor making a mixed eligibility treatment 
decision served a completely different role from that of the com­
mon law trustee those decisions are not fiduciary.42 Private trustees 
do not make treatment judgments of any kind, while physicians 
working for HMOs must make numerous mixed treatment judg­
ments daily.43 The mixed treatment medical settings "bear no more 
resemblance to trust departments than a decision to operate [on a 
patient] turns on the factors controlling the amount of a quarterly 
income distribution."44 The Court rejected the application of the 
common law fiduciary relationship to an HMO physician's mixed 
eligibility and treatment decisions because such an application 
would have the unthinkable consequence of denying HMOs any 
profit for failing "to act solely in the interest of the patient without 
possibility of conflict. "45 
Because it is important that the public maintain confidence in 
the medical profession and the current health care system, it is not 
only proper but also necessary for Congress to amend ERISA to 
provide for patient relief. An amended ERISA should use tradi­
tional common law liability concepts of torts, contracts, and trusts 
to restore quality patient care consistent with the Hippocratic Oath 
serving as the bottom line.46 
38. [d. at 225 ("Under ERISA, however, a fiduciary may have financial interests 
adverse to beneficiaries."). 
39. [d. at 231. 
40. [d. 
41. [d. 
42. /d. at 231-32. 
43. [d. at 232. 
44. [d. 
45. Id. at 233. 
46. Robinson, supra note 3, at 357 (noting that the plaintiff bar has used ex­
panded traditional liability concepts with limited success as an attack against managed 
care providers). 
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One commentator is concerned that an amended ERISA 
would impose increased liability on physicians and ultimately lead 
to higher medical costs for the consumer-patient, as well as in­
creased malpractice costs for the managed care industry.47 Oppo­
nents of an amended ERISA also argue that any ERISA 
amendment that expands the potential medical liability of doctors. 
and other managed care providers could lead to the collapse of a 
system already burdened with increased medical costS.48 However, 
any increased costs associated with amending ERISA are out­
weighed by authorizing plaintiffs to recover damages resulting from 
negligent medical treatment from managed care organizations and 
their employees.49 When plaintiffs are left without a remedy for 
their medical malpractice claims because of ERISA's preemption, it 
is simply viewed as an unfortunate consequence of preemption.50 
The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that Congress 
should amend ERISA to allow plan beneficiaries/patients to assert 
medical malpractice claims and breaches of both fiduciary duty and 
contract against both doctors and HMOs in the managed care in­
dustry. Part I of this Article will begin by presenting the germane 
facts of Pegram.51 It will then analyze the Seventh Circuit's deci­
sion that ERISA does create a fiduciary duty for HMOs handling 
47. J. Scott Andersen, Is Utilization Review the Practice of Medicine?, 19 J. LE. 
GAL MED. 431, 432 (1998). 
48. Id. at 431 ("The American system of health care is at a crossroads. The sys­
tem is on the verge of collapsing under the weight of increased spending which ... will 
dwarf the nation's defense budget and will comprise nearly 18% of the United States 
gross national product.") (citing Leonard A. Hagen, Physician Credentialing: Economic 
Criteria Compete with the Hippocratic Oath, 31 GONZ. L. REV. 427, 429 (1995-96». 
49. James P. Duffy, IV, HMO Doctors as ERISA Fiduciaries: A Bankruptcy Per­
spective, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 125,149 (2000) ("The inability to collect personal 
damages is exacerbated by the fact that plaintiffs may not have a state law cause of 
action against HMO doctors who act negligently because of ERISA's broad preemptive 
powers. "). 
50. Id. at 150. 
There is little doubt that present healthcare procedures give doctors incentives 
to act in a self-serving manner. It is also clear that these HMO practices often 
conflict with the statutory goals of ERISA. This suggests that Congress should 
revisit and revise ERISA to reflect current health care practices. Moreover, 
holding HMO doctors liable as ERISA fiduciaries creates the potential for 
damage awards which physicians could not bear. Many HMO doctors would 
be forced into bankruptcy by these awards. Many more physician partnerships 
could follow suit. There is no clear answer to this problem. Plaintiffs have 
legitimate concerns; however, physician bankruptcy may not be the best re­
sponse. In the end, the question of whether HMO doctors may be ERISA 
fiduciaries is best left for Congress to decide. 
Id. 
51. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 530 U.S. 211 (2000). 
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mixed eligibility and treatment decisions. Part II of the Article will 
examine the Supreme Court's rationale for reversing the Seventh 
Circuit in holding that, the mixed decisions of HMO owner-doctors 
do not raise a fiduciary issue under ERISA. Part II will then dis­
cuss the impact of the Court's decision and the method of analysis 
on managed care issues under ERISA. The Article will conclude, 
in Part III, with the Author's recommendation that Congress 
amend ERISA to provide increased protection for plan benefi­
ciaries asserting health care rights against HMOs. 
I. 	 SEVENTH CIRCUIT TANGLES WITH PEGRAM ISSUES: FINDING 
THE HMO's DECISION WAS FIDUCIARY 
A. Facts 
Through her husband's employer, Cynthia Herdrich ("Her­
drich") participated in a pre-paid health insurance plan (the 
"Plan") operated by Carle Clinic Association, P.e. ("Carle"), 
Health Alliance Medical Plans, Inc. ("HAMP"), and Carle Health 
Insurance Management Company, Inc.52 On October 21, 1992, 
Herdrich filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of McLean County, 
Illinois, charging Carle and Lori Pegram, M.D. ("Dr. Pegram") with 
medical negligence.53 Specifically, Herdrich alleged that she had 
suffered a ruptured appendix and contracted peritonitis due to the 
defendants' "negligence in failing to provide her with timely and 
adequate medical care."54 Herdrich amended her complaint on 
February 18, 1994, to add two counts (Counts III and IV) of state 
law fraud against Carle and HAMP.55 Count III alleged that Carle 
fail[ ed] to disclose certain material facts regarding the ownership 
of RAMP, as well as fail[ed] to advise her that the compensation 
of plan physicians was increased to the extent that they did not 
order diagnostic tests, utilized facilities owned by those physi­
cians, and did not make emergency or consultation referrals. 
Count IV alleged that RAMP breached its duty of good faith and 
52. Id. at 365. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 365 n.t. On March 7, 1991, Dr. Pegram discovered an enlarged mass, 
later determined to be the appendix, in Herdrich's abdomen. Id. Due to Carle's policy 
requiring plan participants to receive treatment at Carle-staffed facilities in non-emer­
gency situations, Dr. Pegram waited for more than a week before obtaining an ultra­
sound that would determine the nature, size, and location of the mass. Id. During this 
waiting period, Herdrich's condition declined and her appendix ruptured, eventually 
resulting in the onset of peritonitis. Id. 
55. Id. at 366. 
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fair dealing by increasing its profits and the profits of its con­
tracted physicians through minimizing the use of diagnostic tests, 
emergency consultation referrals, and facilities not owned by 
such physicians, all to the detriment of plan beneficiaries.56 
Subsequent to the amendment, defendants removed the case 
to federal court, asserting that the two new counts were preempted 
by ERISAY Defendants then filed a motion for summary judg­
ment as to Counts III and IV only.58 The court granted the motion 
with respect to Count IV, because Herdrich was seeking monetary 
damages where ERISA authorized only equitable relief.59 The trial 
judge denied summary judgment on Count III, but concluded that 
ERISA preempted the claim under Count 111.60 Accordingly, the 
trial judge gave Herdrich leave to amend this count so as to more 
fully state her basis for proceeding under ERISA.61 Herdrich's 
amended Count III alleged that the "defendants breached their fi­
duciary duty to plan beneficiaries by depriving them of proper med­
ical care and retaining the savings resulting therefrom for 
themselves."62 The defendants then moved to dismiss Herdrich's 
amended Count III for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted.63 
"The case-including the defendants' motion to dismiss-was 
assigned to a magistrate judge, who recommended that the 
amended count III be dismissed" because Herdrich failed to iden­
tify how any of the named defendants acted as a fiduciary to the 
Plan.64 Herdrich filed an objection to the magistrate's recommen­
dation, which was denied by the district court on April 15, 1996.65 
Counts I and II were tried in early December 1996.66 The jury re­
turned a verdict in Herdrich's favor on both counts, awarding her 
$35,000 in compensatory damages.67 
Herdrich appealed the district court's dismissal of her amended 
56. Id. at 366 n.2. 
57. Id. at 366. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 366-67 & n.3. 
63. Id. at 367. In recommending that the amended count be dismissed, the court 
stated that Herdrich was not entitled to any relief under Count III because she failed 
"to identify how any of the defendants is involved as a fiduciary to the plan." Id. 
64. Id. 
65. /d. 
66. /d. 
67. /d. 
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Count III to the Seventh Circuit, contending that her complaint suf­
ficiently stated "a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under ER­
ISA."68 The defendants, in turn, argued that the Seventh Circuit 
lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because Herdrich did not "file a 
timely notice of appeal."69 Defendants also challenged Herdrich's 
damages request, arguing that beneficiaries of ERISA plans cannot 
recover "anything other than the benefits provided expressly in the 
pl~n."70 Though addressing each of defendants' arguments at 
length, the Seventh Circuit focused primarily on the issue raised by 
Herdrich: whether her pleadings sufficiently alleged that (1) the de­
fendants were plan fiduciaries, (2) "the defendants breached their 
fiduciary duties," and (3) "a cognizable loss resulted."71 ·The re­
mainder of Part I will explore the Seventh Circuit's analysis of these 
three elements, which are necessary to state a claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty under ERISA.72 
B. The Seventh Circuit's Decision 
1. . Defendants as Plan Fiduciaries 
The Seventh Circuit rejected the magistrate's contention, 
adopted by the district court in its dismissal of Count III, that Her­
drich failed to allege how the named defendants acted as fiduciaries 
to the Plan.73 In reaching this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit 
looked to both the plain language and legislative history of ER­
ISA.74 The court focused specifically on 29 U.S.c. § 1002(21)(A): 
Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), a person 
is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises 
any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting 
management of such plan or exercises any authority of [sic] con­
trolrespecting management or disposition of its assets ... or (iii) 
he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility 
in the administration of such plan.75 
The court also noted that Congress, when enacting ERISA, lll­
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 369-80. 
72. Id. at 369; 29 U.S.c. § 1l04(a) (1994 & Supp. 1999). 
73. Pegram, 154 F.3d at 369. 
74. Id. at 369-70. 
75. Id. at 369-70 (quoting 29 U.S.c. § 1002(21)(A) (1994». 
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tended that the definition of "fiduciary" be broadly interpreted.?6 
Evaluating Herdrich's amended Count III in light of this statu­
tory language and history, the court concluded that the amended 
complaint sufficiently identified defendants as plan fiduciaries.?7 
The court considered Herdrich's allegation that the "defendants 
have the exclusive right to decide all disputed and non-routine 
claims under the plan" as evidencing the "discretionary control and 
authority" required of a fiduciary under ERISA.78 The court also 
noted that the Plan's physicians comprised the entire board of di­
rectors, enabling them to control every aspect of the Plan's govern­
ance.79 On the basis of this infrastructure, the court found it 
reasonable to infer that Carle and HAMP were plan fiduciaries.80 
2. Defendants' Breach of Fiduciary Duty· 
After determining that the defendants were in fact plan -fidltci­
aries, the court went on to conclude that Herdrich's complaint suffi­
ciently alleged a breach of the defendants' fiduciary duties.81 
Again, the court reached this conclusion by reference to ERISA's 
statutory language.82 In accordance with 29 U.S.c. § l104(a)(1), a 
plan fiduciary "shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan 
solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries. "83 There­
fore, an ERISA fiduciary that acts in its own interests breaches its 
76. Id. at 370. The Chairman of the House Committee on Education and Labor 
stated: 
The Committee has adopted the view that the definition of fiduciary is of ne­
cessity broad .... A fiduciary need not be a person with direct access to the 
assets of the plan .... Conduct alone may in an appropriate circumstance 
impose fiduciary obligations. It is the clear intention of the Committee that 
any person with a specific duty imposed upon him by this statute be deemed to 
be a fiduciary . . . . . 
120 CONGo REC. 3977, 3983 (Feb. 25, 1974) reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 3293. The.Seventh Circuit 
also noted that, in accordance with this expressed congressional intent, courts routinely 
construe "fiduciary" broadly under ERISA and emphasize "the importance of discre­
tionary control and authority." Pegram, 154 F.3d at 370. 
77. Pegram, 154 F.3d at 370-71. 
78. Id. at 370. 
79. /d. 
80. /d. 
81. . Id. at 371. 
82. Id. 
83. /d. The law also requires an ERISA fiduciary to discharge his duties "for the 
exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and 
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan; (B) with the care ... that a 
prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use ...." 29 
U.S.c. § 1l04(a)(1) (1994). 
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duty of care.84 
As noted by the Seventh Circuit, the ERISA fiduciary duty is 
aimed at managed care incentive schemes "tainted by a conflict of 
interest," like the ones involved in Pegram85 and Shea v. Esensten.86 
In Shea, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the defendants breached 
their fiduciary duty by failing to disclose to plan participants that 
they provided financial incentives to physicians who reduced the 
number of tests and referrals offered to patients.87 Following the 
lead of the Eighth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit in Pegram stated that 
the defendants' infrastructure, which permitted the Plan's physi­
cians to also act as its administrators, at least facially violated its 
fiduciary duty.88 This dual role vested the doctor-owners with the 
authority to determine which claims would be paid, as well as the 
nature and duration of patients' care-expenditures that would di­
rectly affect the physicians' own year-end bonuses.89 The existence 
of a direct correlation between the amount of money spent on tests 
and treatment and the amount received by physicians in the form of 
bonuses led the court to infer that the defendants' discharge of their 
fiduciary duties was colored by an incentive to minimize costS.90 
The Seventh Circuit, recognizing that a "fiduciary's covert 
profiteering at the expense of insureds is inconsistent with its duties 
of acting 'solely in the interest of the participants and benefi­
ciaries,"'91 held that incentive schemes can, under certain circum­
84. Pegram, 154 F.3d at 371 (citing JAMES F. JORDEN ET AL., HANDBOOK ON 
ERISA LITIGATION § 3.03[A], at 3-53 (1994)). 
85. Id. (quoting Lowen v. Tower Asset Mgmt., Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1213 (2d Cir. 
1987)). 
86. 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997). 
87. Id. at 628-29. 
88. 154 F.3d at 380. 
89. Id. at 372. 
90. Id. at 372-73. 
91. Id. at 372 (citing Reis v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., 1995 WL 669583, at *7 
(N.D. Ill. 1995)). 
Drawing parallels to [Reis v. Humana Health Plan, Inc.], Herdrich sets forth, 
in the amended third count of her complaint, the intricacies of the defendants' 
incentive structure. The Plan dictated that the very same HMO administrators 
vested with the authority to determine whether health care claims would be 
paid, and the type, nature, and duration of care to be given, were those physi­
cians who became eligible to receive year-end bonuses as a result of cost-sav­
ings. Because the physician/administrators' year-end bonuses were based on 
the difference between total plan costs (i.e., the costs of providing medical 
services) and revenues (i.e., payments by plan beneficiaries), an incentive ex­
isted for them to limit treatment and, in turn, HMO costs so as to ensure 
larger bonuses. With a jaundiced eye focused firmly on year-end bonuses, it is 
not unrealistic to assume that the doctors rendering care under the Plan were 
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stances, trigger a breach of the ERISA fiduciary duty.92 In so 
ruling, the court was careful not to contradict the well-established 
proposition that dual loyalties are tolerated under ERISA.93 
Rather, the court simply recognized that tolerance of those dual 
loyalties does not extend to a fiduciary that jettisons its responsibil­
ity to the physical well-being of beneficiaries in favor of "loyalty" to 
its own financial interests.94 "Tolerance, in other words, has its 
limits. "95 
In finding that Herdrich's amended Count III sufficiently al­
leged defendants' breach of their ERISA fiduciary duties, the ma­
jority gave no credence to the dissent's argument that only where 
there is a "breakdown in the market" will there exist a possible 
breach due to incentives.96 Unlike the majority, the dissent relied 
on market forces to protect against the potential negative effects of 
incentive schemes, reasoning that plan sponsors would withdtaw 
their support if they perceived any resulting detriment to the Plan 
or its beneficiaries.97 The majority, however, sufficiently undercut 
the application of this market theory by reference to the facts in 
Pegram.98 Presumably due to the underlying incentive scheme, 
Herdrich was forced to wait more than a week to receive the appro­
priate diagnostic testing of the enlarged mass that Dr. Pegram dis­
covered in her abdomen.99 As a result of this delay, her appendix 
ruptured and she suffered a life-threatening illness (peritonitis), 
which necessitated a longer hospital stay and more serious surgery 
at greater cost to both her and the Plan,loo If Cynthia Herdrich's 
experience is even remotely representative, it is reasonable to con­
clude that "market forces are insufficient to cure the deleterious 
swayed to be most frugal when exercising their discretionary authority to the 
detriment of their membership. 
Id. 
92. Id. at 373. The Seventh Circuit was very specific in stating that its decision 
does not imply that the existence of incentives automatically creates a breach of fiduci­
ary duty. Rather, the court held that incentives may give rise to a breach when the 
complaint alleges, as in Pegram, that the fiduciary trust between plan participants and 
plan fiduciaries has been broken. Id. 
93. Id. (citing Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463, 468 (E.D.N.Y. 1981». 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 374. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
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affects [sic] of managed care on the health care industry."101 
3. 	 Depletion of the Plan's Assets Created a Cognizable 
Loss 
Herdrich's allegations that the defendants' incentive system 
depleted plan resources for the benefit of the administering physi­
cians, "possibly to the detriment of their patients," also survived a 
motion to dismiss by the defendants.102 The appeals court did not 
resolve this issue, instead remanding it for the trial court to decide 
whether the defendants breached their fiduciary duty to act only in 
the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries.103 The Seventh 
Circuit opined, however, that plan participants' interests were prob­
ably in conflict with the defendants' policy of depleting plan funds 
with year-end bonus payouts.104 
( The Seventh Circuit believed that Herdrich's claim should not 
be dismissed because her allegations clearly stated that the Plan had 
suffered damages attributable to the defendants' breach. of their fi­
duciary duty.1OS Under ERISA, a plan beneficiary may sue a plan 
fiduciary for breach of duty.106 In such a suit, "plan beneficiaries 
have standing to bring an action on behalf of the plan itself to 
recoup monies· expended in violation of ERISA, as the plaintiff 
[Herdrich] has done here."lo7 The ERISA fiduciary duty articu­
lated in 29 U.S.c. § l109(a) applies to the Plan, and not to any sin­
gle person.1OB 
The Seventh Circuit correctly concluded that the defendants 
potentially breached their fiduciary duty to Herdrich.lo9 The 
court's rationale for stating that the plan's assets are subject to pos­
101. Id. at 374-75 (quoting various articles describing the mentality of doctors, 
nurses, and the public toward profit-based health care). 
102. Id. at 380. The ultimate issue of whether the defendants violated their fidu­
ciary obligations to act solely in the interest of the Plan participants and beneficiaries 
fell not within the jurisdiction ofthe Seventh Circuit, but instead within the jurisdiction 
of the trial court. Id. 
103. Id. at 380. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. "Herdrich alleges that as a result of the defendants' actions, the Plan was 
deprived of.the supplemental medical e?,pense payment amounts in controversy. We 
thus hold that she has alleged with sufficient clarity that the Plan suffered a loss as a 
result of the defendants' actions." Id. 
106. Id. (citing 29 U.S.c. § 1109(a) (1994». 
107. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994». 
108. Id. (citing Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 1992» .. 
. 109. Pegram, 154 F.3d at 380 ("We conclude ... that the trial judge erred in 
dismissing the plaintiff's amended Count III against the defendants for breach of fiduci­
ary duty under ERISA."). 
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sible misuse because they· are annually depleted by the HMO 
owner-doctors is not clear, however, because the court fails to artic­
ulate that the depletion process is a "poor business decision" when 
inspired by substandard medical care.1l0 Implicit in the Seventh 
Circuit's rationale is the theory that a practice of providing ques­
tionable medical services in order to increase profits places the Plan 
assets at risk. This is because such practices are a reasonable, fore­
seeable, and proximate cause of the Plan not being particularly 
marketable to employers.111 The Herdrich complaint thus survived 
a motion to dismiss because the HMO's incentive scheme contextu­
ally created a reasonable "inference that. market forces have 
failed ... to protect the interests"112 of beneficiaries under the Plan 
to receive quality health care. 
II. REVERSAL OF FORTUNE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 

AND ITS LEGACY 

A. 	 Impact of the Judiciary's Preemption Theory on Managed 
Care Issues under ERISA 
Some commentators take the position that ERISA decisions 
concerning the role of managed care organizations "simply do not 
implicate the danger of judicial encroachment on legislative 
power."113 Congress intended for ERISA plan beneficiaries to be 
compensated when injured by an HMO's economic decision-mak­
ing process.H4 
. 110. Id. at 382 (Flaum, J., dissenting) ("In the long run, [denying valid claims] 
would harm an insurer by inducing current customers to leave and by damaging its 
chances of acquiring new customers. Thus, no conflict of interest exists because paying 
meritorious claims is in [the insurer's] best interest.") (citing Mers v. Marriott InCI 
Group Accidental Death & Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d 1014, 1020-21 (7th Cir. 
1998». 
111. Id. at 383 (Flaum, J., dissenting) ("[C)ourts have a role in ensuring that in­
centives are implemented in accordance with the fiduciary duties imposed by ER­
ISA .... [S]ponsors and beneficiaries need information about the financial incentives 
that are in place. Thus, ... the failure to disclose financial incentives is a breach of 
fiduciary duty under ERISA."); see Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997). 
112. Pegram, 154 F.3d at 382. "[T]here is no guarantee that a sponsor will be able 
to find satisfactory alternatives in the marketplace. The plaintiffs complaint, however, 
alleges only that an incentive to deny coverage exists, which [does not] support an infer­
ence that market forces have failed ... to protect the interests of beneficiaries." Id. 
113. Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, Form Function and Managed Care 
Torts: Achieving Fairness and Equity in ERISA Jurisprudence, 35 Hous. L. REv. 985, 
1038 (1998). The Jacobson article articulates a number of compelling reasons why 
courts should grant substantial justice to HMO beneficiaries by restricting ERISA pre­
emption rationale. Id. at 1040-48. 
114. 	 Id. at 1039. 
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The Supreme Court in Pegram cited to the Jacobson and Pom­
fret article115 and tentatively adopted its suggestion that courts use 
a functional approach to hold managed care entities accountable 
for economic and medical decisions under ERISA.116 Approaching 
ERISA from a functional perspective allows one to view a court as 
a pragmatic and functioning entityJ17 "[T]he judge steps into the 
legislator's shoes, exercising the same sort of practical intelligence 
that the legislator would have utilized had he or she foreseen the 
situation."118 
The Supreme Court in Pegram held that ERISA preempts 
state law claims for substandard medical care, relying on ERISA's 
legislative history to support its conclusion that mixed eligibility 
and treatment decisions are not fiduciary decisions.119 Since ER­
ISA dominates medical treatment issues in this nation, it is impor­
tant that the preemption issue be addressedPo Because of the lack 
of express congressional intent, the preemption issue presented 
under ERISA in the health care context is whether ERISA allows 
HMOs to escape liability for providing negligent medical treat­
ment.121 Simply stated, did Congress, by implication, intend ER­
ISA to allow HMOs to make eligibility and treatment decisions 
detrimental to patients because those decisions enhance the HMO's 
financial position?122 A court holding that ERISA preempts state 
law claims against substandard medical care provided by HMOs to 
covered employee plan beneficiaries would assign to Congress a 
mean-spirited intent "contrary to the law in all fifty states" which 
protects people against unreasonable medical treatment.123 A real­
istic judicial view of congressional intent toward HMOs supports 
the conclusion that Congress intended for an HMO to be liable to 
patient/plan beneficiaries when the HMO's economic interest is a 
substantial factor in its decision to provide beneficiaries with unrea­
sonable medical services or no medical treatment at aU.124 
115. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 223 (2000). 
116. Jacobson & Pomfret, supra note 113, at 987. 
117. Id. at 995. 
118. Id. at 995 nA9 (quoting Eric G. Zahnd, The Application of Universal Laws to 
Particular Cases: A Defense of Equity in Aristotelians and Anglo-American Law, 59 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 269 (1996». 
119. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 236-37. 
120. Jacobson & Pomfret, supra note 113, at 987. 
121. Id. at 988-89. 
122. !d. at 995. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. ("As with any other business enterprise, MCOs [managed care organiza­
tions] make economic decisions. These decisions will occasionally impose costs on ER­
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Jacobson and Pomfret make an insightful and convincing argu­
ment that the Supreme Court has committed significant error by 
"its misinterpretation of ERISA's legislative history"125 in its pre­
emption theory.126 They argue that the Court's treatment of ER­
ISA's preemptive legislative history is flawed for three reasons: (1) 
failure to consider ERISA's broad purposes, (2) failure to limit ER­
ISA's preemption clause to ordinary field and conflict preemption, 
and (3) mischaracterization of ERISA as an "intricate, comprehen­
sive statute. "127 
The first reason cited by Jacobson and Pomfret deals with the 
Court's failure to follow the general rule of preemption analysis, 
which provides that courts should interpret a statute in light of its 
broader underlying policies.128 In this context, the Court failed to 
consider ERISA's policy of protecting the participants and benefi­
ciaries of an employer sponsored health plan.129 The Jacobson and 
Pomfret article strongly disagreed with the view of commentators 
that the plan and the employer, rather than individuals receiving 
health care coverage, were the direct beneficiaries of the uniform 
administration of health plans created by the Court's preemption 
theory.130 Jacobson and Pomfret believe ERISA's legislative his­
tory as well as the provisions of the statute outlining its policies 
declare "unambiguously that the statute protects plan participants 
and beneficiaries."l3l ERISA's legislative history appears to con­
vincingly support those advocating that ERISA's uniformity goal 
"and the preemption that achieves it, prevents employers and plans 
from shifting higher administrative costs to employees and benefi­
ciaries through reduced benefit levels."132 
ISA plan participants. In addition, MCOs impose additional costs due to their 
negligence. "). 
125. Id. at 1008. 
126. Id. at 1008-15. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 1010. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 1010-11. 
131. Id. at 1011. 
132. Id. (citing Seema R. Shah, Comment, Loosening ERISA's Preemptive Grip 
on HMO Medical Malpractice Clams: A Response to Pacificare of Oklahoma v. Bur­
rage, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1545, 1573 (1996)). 
Contrary to the view taken by some, ERISA's goal of uniformity was not de­
signed to protect employers, employee benefit plans, or plan fiduciaries. In 
fact, ERISA bestowed the advantages of federal uniformity to ensure that em­
ployers and employee benefit plans would not offset their administrative costs 
onto vulnerable employee beneficiaries and their dependents. Regulatory 
uniformity was the means to achieve the desired end of protecting employees. 
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The second error in the Supreme Court's interpretation of ER­
ISA's preemption legislative history is the mistaken conclusion that 
ERISA preempts state laws regulating employer sponsored health 
benefit plans even in the absence of a conflict because Congress has 
not expressly or implicitly occupied the field.133 As a general rule, 
when Congress exercises its enumerated power to create federal 
legislation, the federal law usurps any parallel state law.134 When 
there is conflict between the federal and state legislation, the 
Supremacy Clause dictates that state law is inferior and must give 
way to the superior federallaw.135 In creating a law, Congress may 
expressly decide to "occupy the field," thus disallowing correspond­
ing state laws.136 Preemption issues are rarely presented in an un­
ambiguous environment because Congress does not always clearly 
articulate its purpose.137 Sometimes it may be merely implied that 
Congress has occupied the field.138 
The Court's preemption rationale for HMOs should be consis­
tent with requiring HMOs to act in a way that protects the interest 
of plan beneficiaries.139 The Court could hold that since Congress 
has not expressly or implicitly preempted state laws allowing for 
traditional negligence actions against employer sponsored health 
plans, traditional negligence remedies still exist. In the absence of 
convincing evidence demonstrating a Congressional intent to over­
ride traditional negligence remedies because of conflict, or a con­
gressional desire to occupy the field in the managed care industry, 
the Supreme Court should not presume that state negligence laws 
do not apply to defendant HMOs.140 A healthy respect for the 
principles of federalism makes it necessary for courts to construe 
Given ERISA's purpose, HMOs should not receive ERISA's solicitude; any 
special benefits arising from ERISA's regulatory control should be conferred 
to the employee-participants of health care plans, not the ERISA-regulated 
HMO plan. Preemption of malpractice claims would give HMOs a protective 
benefit that disrupts ERISA's intended balanced protection. 
Shah, supra, at 1573 (citations omitted). 
133. Jacobson & Pomfret, supra note 113, at 1012. 
134. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 347 
(6th ed. 2000). 
135. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2). 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Jacobson & Pomfret, supra note 113, at 1011 (declaring that the overriding 
purpose of ERISA is to protect plan employee beneficiaries). 
140. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 134, at 351 (citing Malone v. White 
Motors Corp., 444 U.S. 911 (1979) and stating that the state statute relating to pensions 
was not preempted by older federal law even though a new federal statute expressly 
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ERISA against traditional state regulatory policies.141 
Congress, in its ambiguous ERISA preemptive debate, did not 
intend to undermine federalism, according to Jacobson and Pom­
fret. 142 It would threaten the spirit and rationale of Palsgraf v. 
Long Island R.R. CO.143 to hold that HMOs do not have a duty to 
use reasonable care toward plan beneficiaries because they were 
unforeseeable victims of substandard medical treatment.144 Justice 
Cardozo said in Palsgraf that "the risk reasonably to be perceived 
defines the duty to be obeyed."14s There is little doubt that an 
HMO can foresee that, by communicating an excessive emphasis on 
profits to its doctors, it creates an increased risk of doctors provid­
ing plan beneficiaries, as a class, with substandard services. If man­
aged care organizations do not owe a standard of due care to plan 
beneficiaries, to whom is this duty owed? 
As Justice Andrews said in his di~senting opinion in Palsgraf, 
"Due care is a duty imposed on each one of us to protect society 
from unnecessary danger, not to protect A,B, or C alone."146 Not 
even in an election year would Congress be so irrational as to re­
lieve HMOs of any legal liability for negligent conduct that is a sub­
stantial factor in harming plan beneficiaries. "The proposition is 
this: Everyone owes to the world at large the duty of refraining 
from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of 
others."147 When the unreasonable conduct of an HMO is a sub­
stantial factor in creating a greater risk of harm to a plan benefici­
ary, the managed care entity should be liable under the same tort 
theories applicable to others that act unreasonably.148 If an HMO's 
standard business practice places greater emphasis on saving money 
provided for preemption). "In modem [preemption] decisions the Supreme Court has 
refused either to presume or infer [Congressional] intent." Id. at 350. 
141. Jacobson & Pomfret, supra note 113, at 992. 
142. Id. at 992-93 (explaining that "courts have viewed state law as the relevant 
backgrounds against which Congress legislated, an assumption that tends to limit the 
scope of preemption and thereby respects federalism") (footnotes omitted). 
143. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
144. Id. at 99 (describing how the the defendant railway's guard pushed a board­
ing passenger and the passenger's package covered by a newspaper fell on the rails and 
exploded, the shock of which threw down scales at the other end of the platform that 
injured the plaintiff). 
145. Id. at 100. 
146. Id. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
147. Id. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
148. Cf Hairston v. Alexander Tank & Equip. Co., 311 S.E.2d 559 (N.C. 1984) 
(involving wrongful death action brought by deceased motorist's wife against an auto­
mobile dealer and the driver of a flatbed truck, after truck struck and propelled a van 
into the motorist's disabled vehicle and crushed the motorist to death). 
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than on protecting and saving lives, the resulting harm to the bene­
ficiary is not "so highly improbable and extraordinary an occur­
rence" as to bear no reasonable connection to the HMO's original 
negligence in advocating substandard medical treatmenP49 
Even the court's mistaken conclusion that the legislative his­
tory allows for a more expansive preemption than field and conflict 
preemption150 does not support relieving an HMO of liability un­
less the connection between the HMO's negligence and the treating 
doctor appears unnatural.151 
If the connection between negligence and the injury appears un­
natural, unreasonable and improbable in the light of common ex­
perience, the negligence, if deemed a cause of the injury at all, is 
to be considered a remote rather than a proximate cause. It im­
poses too heavy a responsibility for negligence to hold the tort 
feasor responsible for what is unusual and unlikely to happen or 
for what was only remotely and slightly probable.152 
A flawed expansive ERISA preemption theory which extends 
beyond field and conflict preemption should not deny that states 
have an important interest in holding managed care organizations 
liable for negligent conduct. HMOs must be held responsible for 
negligent conduct that is the natural, reasonable, and probable re­
sult of a policy that places greater emphasis on profits than on the 
quality of health care. 
Jacobson and Pomfret state that ERISA's third legislative his­
tory problem relates to the Court's false characterization of ERISA 
as an "intricate comprehensive statute addressing employee health 
plans and the preemption provision."153 When the Court character­
izes ERISA legislation as intricate and comprehensive, it decides 
that the "scheme warrants a cautious approach to inferring reme­
dies not expressly authorized by the text."154 Any claim that ER­
ISA is comprehensive with respect to employee health plans 
149. Id. at 567-68. 
150. Jacobson & Pomfret, supra note 113, at 1012. 
151. Hairston, 311 S.E.2d at 567. 
152. Id. 
153. Jacobson & Pomfret, supra note 113, at 1013. 
154. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 247 
(2000). "But ERISA's 'comprehensive and reticulated' scheme warrants a cautious ap­
proach to inferring remedies not expressly authorized by the text, especially given the 
alternative and intuitively appealing interpretation, urged by Salomon, that § 502(a)(3) 
authorizes suits only against defendants upon whom a duty is imposed by ERISA's 
substantive provisions." Id. (citation omitted). 
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mischaracterizes the statute.155 In legislative debates, Congress en­
gaged in limited discussion about employee health plans, in com­
parison to its exhausting and far-reaching debate concerning 
employee pension plans.156 This legislative history clearly suggests 
that ERISA is not a comprehensive health plan statute but rather a 
comprehensive pension statute.157 
Jacobson and Pomfret correctly postulate that "[t]he Court 
seems to use its conclusion that ERISA is comprehensive with re­
spect to health plans to legitimize its deregulation of health care via 
preemption."158 If the Court had recognized that ERISA was not 
comprehensive with respect to health plans, but was essentially a 
pension statute, it might have been more hesitant to preempt so 
much state health care regulation."159 It is clear that the Supreme 
Court is hard pressed to justify a position that ERISA's comprehen­
sive approach to pensions allows HMOs to be unregulated by states 
for substandard medical care proximately caused by their negligent 
health care policies toward plan beneficiaries.16o 
B. 	 Reasoning Behind ERISA's Preemption Rationale Rule 
Threatens Traditional State Regulation of Health Care 
Supreme Court decisions concerning which state laws are ap­
propriately preempted under ERISA have been regarded as a fail­
ure by both legal commentators and Justice Scalia.161 The Court's 
generous use of the preemption rationale in analyzing ERISA jeop­
ardizes the states' ability to regulate health care, an area of tradi­
tional state concern.162 When the Court interprets ERISA so as to 
deny a state the ability to regulate its own health care laws without 
express preemption from Congress, it calls into question the Su­
preme Court's basic commitment to federalist principles.163 The 
155. 	 See Jacobson & Pomfret, supra note 113, at 1013-14. 
156. 	 Id. 
157. Id. ("ERISA only regulates three aspects of health plans and leaves the re­
mainder unregulated. Such minimal regulation is simply not comprehensive by any 
stretch of the imagination.") (footnote omitted). 
158. 	 Id. (footnote omitted). 
159. 	 Id. 
160. Id. at 1009 (stating that "a court begins its preemption analysis with a deter­
mination of whether Congress intended a particular area to go unregulated by the 
states") (footnote omitted). 
161. Id. at 1002 (citing Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham 
Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 335-36 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring». 
162. 	 See id. at 1004. 
163. Cf United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-16 (2000) (holding a section 
of the Violence Against Women Act unconstitutional by reasoning, in part, that Con­
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Court's ERISA preemption theory is flawed because it precludes 
states from providing established tort, contract, and fiduciary reme­
dies for plan beneficiaries suffering from inadequate health care at 
the hands of the managed care industry.164 It is at least debatable 
whether Congress can expressly preempt state regulation of tradi­
tional health care remedies.165 
The Supreme Court's federalism theory in Pegram is flawed 
because the Court states that the federal courthouse doors could 
not be opened to plan beneficiaries seeking a fiduciary malpractice 
claim against an HMO without unequivocally opening state court­
house doors to those asserting lack of reasonable care malpractice 
claims.166 The Court in Pegram should have simply declared that 
because mixed eligibility and treatment decisions made by HMO 
doctors are not fiduciary decisions under ERISA, the plaintiff Her­
drich does not have a fiduciary claim. The Pegram Court should 
have concluded that a plaintiff's right to establish a negligence mal­
practice claim against an HMO and its physicians for mixed eligibil­
ity and treatment decisions must be resolved in state court because 
health care is "a subject oftraditional state regulation"167 which has 
not been preempted. 
C. 	 The Court Discusses ERISA's Fiduciary Standards for HMOs 
Making Mixed Eligibility and Treatment Decisions 
In Pegram, the Court held that mixed eligibility and treatment 
decisions made by HMO doctors are not fiduciary acts under ER­
ISA because Congress did not intend for the common law trustee 
fiduciary standard to apply .to such decisions.168 The Court finds 
any extensive analogy between an ERISA fiduciary and a common 
law trustee to be troublesome.169 Whereas the trustee at common 
law characteristically wears only one fiduciary hat when he takes 
action to affect a beneficiary, an ERISA trustee may wear different 
hats such as being employer to the beneficiaries pO ERISA, how­
gress might otherwise "obliterate the Constitution's distinction between national and 
local authority"). 
164. Cf United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (holding that gun-free 
school zones law was unconstitutional because it prohibited the state from exercising 
judgment in an area traditionally regulated by the states). 
165. See id. 
166. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 234-37 (2000). 
167. [d. at 237. 
168. Id. 
169. /d. at 225. 
170. Id. 
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ever, requires its fiduciary to wear only one hat at a time, and to 
"wear the fiduciary hat when making fiduciary decisions."17l ER­
ISA allows an employer serving as a plan fiduciary to make a deci­
sion adverse to an employee beneficiary, such as firing the 
employee, only when the decision is not related to the ERISA 
plan.172 Under ERISA an employer sponsoring a plan may modify 
the terms of the plan by providing employees with fewer benefits 
without breaching its ERISA fiduciary duties.173 Thus, while super­
ficially distinguishable, the fiduciary responsibilities owed under 
both the common law and ERISA are substantively similar be­
cause, in each case, the fiduciary is prohibited from acting in a man­
ner that harms the beneficiary's interest.174 
The Court also found that Congress never intended for any 
HMO to be treated as a fiduciary in making mixed eligibility and 
treatment decisions.175 Exposing HMOs to financial liability for 
their physicians' mixed eligibility and treatment decisions on a fidu­
ciary duty theory would have an adverse impact on those HMOs 
providing medical care for profit.176 Herdrich proposed as a rem­
edy the return to the plan of profits gained by the HMO's owners as 
a result of such mixed decisions.177 To grant Herdrich this remedy, 
in the Court's opinion, "would be nothing less than elimination of 
the for-profit HMO"178 and "could portend the end of nonprofit 
HMOs as well."179 
The Court also noted that a refusal to dismiss Herdrich's com­
plaint could destroy HMOs altogether and undermine Congress' 
goal of allowing HMOs to make profits by assuming financial risks 
171. Id. (citing Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 443-44 (1999); 
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996)). 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 227-28. 
It will help to keep two sorts of arguably administrative acts in mind. What we 
will call pure "eligibility decisions" turn on the plan's coverage of a particular 
condition or medical procedure for its treatment. "Treatment decisions," by 
contrast, are choices about how to go about diagnosing and treating a patent's 
[sic] condition: given a patient's constellation of symptoms, what is the appro­
priate medical response? . 
Id. (citations omitted). 
176. Id. at 233. 
177. Id. (citing 29 U.S.c. § 1l09(a) (1994) ("[R]eturn of all profits is an appropri­
ate ERISA remedy.")). 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 233 n.ll. 
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for the provision of health care.180 The Court's opinion established 
that it is not consistent with congressional intent "to translate fidu­
ciary duty into a standard that would allow recovery from an HMO 
whenever a mixed decision [is] influenced by the HMO's financial 
incentive [and results] in a bad outcome for the patient."181 The 
Supreme Court recognized that a "mixed decision made solely to 
benefit the HMO or its physician would violate an ERISA fiduciary 
duty."182 The Court noted, however, that the fiduciary standard ar­
ticulated by Herdrich is far more restrictive by requiring "an eye 
single" toward participants' interests.183 Thus, the Court rejected 
Herdrich's standard,184 concluding that under her single-eye fiduci­
ary requirement "every claim of fiduciary breach by an HMO phy­
sician making a mixed decision would boil down to a malpractice 
claim, and the fiduciary standard would be nothing but the malprac­
tice standard traditionally applied in actions against physicians. "185 
The fact that the HMO's defense would be that its physician acted 
for good medical reasons led the Court to characterize the single­
eye fiduciary standard as nothing but a pretext to federalize the 
traditional medical malpractice standard.186 The only value to plan 
participants of such ERISA fiduciary litigation would be eligibility 
for attorney's fees if their claims were successful.187 A doctor could 
also "be subject to suit in federal court applying an ERISA stan­
dard of reasonable medical skill."188 Allowing doctors to be sued 
under that circumstance would appear to preempt a state malprac­
tice claim, even though ERISA does not preempt such claims ab­
sent a clear manifestation of congressional intent.189 
180. Id. at 233 ("[F]or over 27 years Congress has promoted the formation of 
HMO practices. The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 allowed the forma­
tion of HMOs that assume financial risks for the provision of health care services, and 
Congress has amended the Act several times, most recently in 1996.") (citations 
omitted). 
181. Id. at 234. 
182. Id. at 235. 
183. Id. (citing Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982)). 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 235-36 ("[I]n States that do not allow malpractice actions against 
HMOs the fiduciary claim [offers] a further defendant to be sued for direct liability, 
and ... the HMO might have a deeper pocket than the physician. But ... ERISA was 
not enacted out of concern that physicians were too poor to be sued .... "). 
187. Id. at 236. 
188. !d. 
189. Id. (citing N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Trav­
elers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654-55 (1995)). 
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III. CONCLUSION: CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND ERISA To 

PUT PATIENTS BEFORE POCKETBOOKS 

Those who believe that the marketplace will operate to main­
tain an appropriate balance of power between patients' needs and 
the corporate bottom line should remember this word of caution 
from the Seventh Circuit's majority opinion in Pegram. Doctors, 
and not insurance executives, are the experts in determining what is 
best for their patients.19o Accordingly, only trained doctors, after 
consultation with their patients, should be allowed to make deci­
sions related to medical care.191 Unfortunately, however, modern 
doctors are constrained by the bureaucracy, administration, and fi­
nancial incentives associated with HMOs, which "overturn doctors' 
decisions, deny treatment and then claim in court that they don't 
practice medicine, only provide coverage, so that HMOs cannot be 
sued for medical malpractice."192 
The legislative history of ERISA simply does not clearly mani­
fest intent to absolve HMOs and their physicians of negligent con­
duct, which is a substantial factor in a beneficiary receiving 
unreasonable medical care.193 In Corporate Health Insurance v. 
Texas Department of Insurance,194 the Fifth Circuit held that ER­
ISA does not preempt Texas law by allowing people to sue their 
managed care health plans for malpractice for negligent treatment 
decisions.195 An HMO sued in federal district court to challenge a 
Texas statute on ERISA preemption grounds.196 The statute gives 
potential plaintiffs a cause of action against HMOs that do not ex­
ercise ordinary care in making their health care treatment deci­
sions.197 Judge Higginbotham said the Texas law does not 
encompass claims based on an HMO's "denial of coverage for a 
medical service recommended by the treating physician: that dis­
pute is one over coverage ...."198 The provision in the Texas law, 
however, permits "suit for claims that a treating physician was neg­
190. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 377 (7th Cir. 1998). 
191. Id. ("Medical care should not be subject to the whim of the new layer of 
insurance bureaucracy now dictating the most basic, as well as the important, medical 
policies and procedures from the boardroom."). 
192. Id. at 378 (quoting Jamie Court, In Critical Condition: Holding HMOs Ac­
countable for their Egregious Conduct, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 1998, at 13). 
193. See Jacobson & Pomfret, supra note 113, at 1008-15. 
194. 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000). 
195. Id. at 534. 
196. Id. at 53l. 
197. Id. at 534. 
198. Id. 
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ligent in delivering medical services, and it imposes vicarious liabil­
ity on managed care entities for that negligence."199 The provision 
was determined to be valid and not preempted by ERISA.200 The 
Corporate Health Insurance opinion conceded that a state law that 
regulates an HMO in its administrative capacity is preempted under 
ERISA.201 However, when HMOs are wearing their health care 
providers' hats, they are subject to traditional state regulation of 
the health care industry.202 The Fifth Circuit takes the position that 
ERISA preemption applies when a doctor is making a coverage de­
cision under the plan.203 According to the court, however, the ER­
ISA preemption rationale cannot insulate doctors from malpractice 
claims and "accountability to their state licensing agency or associa­
tion charged to enforce professional standards regarding medical 
decisions."204 The Fifth Circuit properly concluded that Congress 
did not intend "for ERISA to supplant ... [a] state['s] regulation of 
the quality of medical practice. "205 States are only using their tradi­
tional police power in regulating the quality of health care treat­
ment decisions.206 "A suit for medical malpractice against a doctor 
is not preempted by ERISA simply because those services were ar­
ranged by an HMO and paid for by an ERISA plan."207 
Congressional failure to make it completely clear that ERISA 
199. Id. 
200. Id. at 535. 
201. Id. at 534. 
202. Id. 
203. Id . 
. 204. Id. at 534-35. 
205. Id. at 535. 
.The Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits have held that medical negligence 
claims against HMOs for vicarious and direct liability are not within the scope 
of § 502(a) and, therefore, are not completely preempted because they involve 
conduct by the HMO in its capacity as a provider and arranger of health ser­
vices and not as plan administrator. . 
Id. at 535 n.25; see Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 646 (7th Cir. 1995) (vicarious claims); 
Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 1995) (vicarious and direct 
claims); Lupo v. Human Affairs Int'!, Inc., 28 F.3d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1994) (direct 
claims). 
For federal district courts allowing suit for vicarious liability, see Yanez v. Humana 
Medical Plan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 1314, 1316 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Ray v. Value Behavioral 
Health, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 417,423-24 (D. Nev. 1997); Schachter v. PacifiCare of Okla., 
Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1448, 1451 (N.D. Okla. 1995); Chaghervand v. CareFirst, 909 F. Supp. 
304,311 (D. Md. 1995); Smith v. HMO Great Lakes, 852 F. Supp. 669, 671-72 (N.D. III. 
1994). 
206. Corporate Health Ins., 215 F.3d at 535. 
207. Id. ("Likewise, the vicarious liability of the entities for whom the doctor 
acted as an agent is rooted in general principles of state agency law. Seen in this light, 
the Act simply codifies Texas's already-existing standards regarding medical care."). 
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does not preempt traditional state health law claims against HMOs 
leaves many, including doctors, to seek a judicial solution through 
creative litigation. In March 2001, three state medical associations 
representing doctors filed a lawsuit accusing HMOs of engaging in a 
pattern of racketeering activity to deny necessary medical care.208 
A representative of one of these state medical associations said 
"[w]e felt we had to go to the courthouse to force the companies to 
respect the patient-doctor relationship. "209 
When an HMO's conduct is a substantial factor in beneficiaries 
receiving substandard medical treatment, basic principles of feder­
alism require Congress to protect the states from federal judicial 
encroachment created by Congress' own ambiguity with regard to 
ERISA's preemption intent. Either Congress or the Supreme 
Court should clarify that Congress did not intend for ERISA to 
allow HMOs to escape liability for negligent health care treatment 
decisions that proximately cause a plaintiff's injury. The Supreme 
Court should hold that HMOs might be held liable for any conduct 
that unreasonably interferes with the provision of medical services 
to an ERISA beneficiary because Congress did not intend to deny 
state law tort remedies to employees needing medical services. 
Only the Court's failure to properly understand ERISA's legislative 
history precludes it from finding that HMOs may be defendants for 
unreasonably interfering with the delivery of health care to covered 
employees. This congressional ambiguity demonstrates a lack of 
political will and is itself political negligence. Patients and doctors 
continue to suffer because of HMOs' preoccupation with profits. 
Congress must end this suffering by enacting legislation that will 
clearly allow states to hold HMOs accountable for substandard care 
under state tort law. Congress should not continue to ignore pleas 
from patients and doctors alike to recognize that an HMO owes a 
duty of reasonable care to covered beneficiaries-a duty to ensure 
they receive services doctors believe are medically necessary with­
out regard to financial profit. 
208. See Milt Freudenheim, Doctors Insist HMOs Pay Up: Suits Cite Conspiracy 
to Cut Costs, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 27, 2001, at AI, available at 2001 WL 3008836 (dis­
cussing the lawsuit filed by the Texas Medical Association and similar groups against 
eight health insurers alleging that the insurers intentionally delayed or denied payments 
to doctors in violation of civil racketeering and other laws). 
209. Id. 

